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ABSTRACT The Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene challenged Wisconsin labo-
ratories to examine their biosafety practices and improve their culture of biosafety.
One hundred three clinical and public health laboratories completed a questionnaire-
based, microbiology-focused biosafety risk assessment. Greater than 96% of the re-
spondents performed activities related to specimen processing, direct microscopic
examination, and rapid nonmolecular testing, while approximately 60% performed
culture interpretation. Although they are important to the assessment of risk, data
speciﬁc to patient occupation, symptoms, and travel history were often unavailable
to the laboratory and, therefore, less contributory to a microbiology-focused bio-
safety risk assessment than information on the specimen source and test requisition.
Over 88% of the respondents complied with more than three-quarters of the mitiga-
tion control measures listed in the survey. Facility assessment revealed that subsets
of laboratories that claim biosafety level 1, 2, or 3 status did not possess all of the
biosafety elements considered minimally standard for their respective classiﬁcations.
Many laboratories reported being able to quickly correct the minor deﬁciencies iden-
tiﬁed. Task assessment identiﬁed deﬁciencies that trended higher within the general
(not microbiology-speciﬁc) laboratory for core activities, such as packaging and ship-
ping, direct microscopic examination, and culture modalities solely involving screens
for organism growth. For traditional microbiology departments, opportunities for im-
provement in the cultivation and management of highly infectious agents, such
as acid-fast bacilli and systemic fungi, were revealed. These results derived from
a survey of a large cohort of small- and large-scale laboratories suggest the ne-
cessity for continued microbiology-based understanding of biosafety practices,
vigilance toward biosafety, and enforcement of biosafety practices throughout
the laboratory setting.
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Clinical, public health, and research laboratories must constantly demonstrate vigi-lance in the context of hazards associated with the cultivation and propagation of
infectious agents. The scope of laboratory-acquired infections was the subject of a
recent review by Singh (1). On an historic basis, the most commonly reported
laboratory-associated infections included brucellosis, Q fever, hepatitis, typhoid fever,
tularemia, tuberculosis, dermatomycosis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, psittacosis,
and coccidioidomycosis (2, 3), with case fatality rates ranging from 0.5% (Q fever,
dermatomycosis) to 7.5% (typhoid fever, psittacosis) (4). Contemporary surveys have
revealed that tuberculosis, brucellosis, and enteric infections (particularly shigellosis)
are among the most common laboratory-acquired infections (5, 6). Noteworthy for
Brucella spp. is an occupational infection risk (641 cases per 100,000 microbiologists)
that substantially exceeds that for the general population (0.08 cases per 100,000
individuals) (6). A similar disparity has been noted for Neisseria meningitidis. Moreover,
one cannot discount the impact of additional laboratory-acquired fungal (7–9), viral (7,
10–12), and parasitic (13, 14) agents of infection, as well as purported bioweapons (15),
on the landscape of biosafety.
In a regional U.S. survey conducted from 1978 to 1982, Jacobson et al. (16) reported
an annual laboratory-acquired infection incidence rate of 5.0 per 1,000 laboratorians
within small laboratories (deﬁned as 25 laboratorians), which is in contrast to a rate
of 1.5 per 1,000 laboratorians in larger laboratories (P  0.05). On the other hand, a
survey of doctoral-level clinical microbiology directors (6) revealed that laboratories
serving clinical entities with 200 beds reported more instances of exposure and
infections over a 3-year period than did perceived smaller laboratories. In this data set,
the greater proportion of laboratory-acquired infections caused by Shigella spp., Bru-
cella spp., Salmonella spp., Staphylococcus aureus, Escherichia coli O157:H7, and Coccid-
ioides immitis emanated from the larger laboratories. These variable data imply that
all laboratory professionals be trained to safely assess the risk of the tasks that they
perform.
Laboratory biosafety is a form of prospective risk management in which individuals
make judgments to avoid potentially negative outcomes while being cognizant of the
fact that the information provided may contain uncertainty. In this dynamic paradigm,
successful risk management and the prevention of laboratory-acquired infections may
be impacted by sample volume, microbial pathogenicity, routes of exposure, host
immune status, and the workload, knowledge, and experience of the individuals in the
laboratory (17). A formal biosafety risk assessment is a three-facet process by which
hazards are identiﬁed, the risk associated with these hazards is evaluated, and the
means by which the hazard can be eliminated or controlled are determined (18).
The Wisconsin Clinical Laboratory Network (WCLN) is a clinical and public health
laboratory network developed by the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene (WSLH). A
subgroup of this network is a Laboratory Technical Advisory Group (LabTAG) that
assists WSLH in training, educational, and collaborative activities (19). With the overall
goal of improving the culture of biosafety in Wisconsin laboratories, LabTAG developed
a tool that was distributed to WCLN laboratories for the self-performance of a
microbiology-focused biosafety risk assessment. The survey nature of this tool facili-
tated a baseline assessment of a large cohort of clinical and public health laboratories
in the performance of microbiology duties ranging from specimen triage to full culture
analysis.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
A questionnaire for biosafety risk assessment was collaboratively developed by WSLH and LabTAG
and distributed to 150 WCLN laboratories in the fall of 2015. This questionnaire was divided into two
sections. The initial portion of the questionnaire was a facility assessment (assessment of risk on the basis
of the laboratory structure and design), in which laboratories were asked to report their biosafety level
(BSL) status in the context of itemized standards published by U.S. federal agencies (20). The second
portion of the questionnaire was a task assessment (assessment of risk on the basis of the tasks/tests
performed in the laboratory) in which laboratories were requested to scrutinize their risk relative to seven
core activities: specimen collection and transport; specimen processing and handling; rapid nonmolecu-
lar, nonserology assays (examples range from rapid inﬂuenza virus antigen detection to HIV antibody
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detection using membrane-bound cartridges); direct microscopic examination (including parasitology);
culture setup; performance of screening cultures (either those that involve chromogenic media or those
in which negative plates are discarded and positive plates are shipped to a reference laboratory); and
culture interpretation (including interpretation of routine bacteriology, mycology, mycobacteriology,
and virology cultures). Queries related to task assessment encompassed the preanalytic, analytic, and
postanalytic stages for each core activity. The respondents were asked to indicate their utilization of
required and additional preferred mitigation control measures, as described by the risk assessment
document. Required mitigation controls were those compiled from a number of sources (20–22), while
additional preferred mitigation controls were largely reﬂective of best practices. Questions were written
in a fashion to prompt a yes/no response. Responses of “no” were classiﬁed as biosafety gaps, and the
laboratories were asked to provide commentary on responses of “no.”
RESULTS
Scope of activity. By early 2016, 103 of 150 laboratories (68.7%) had returned
completed surveys. While all respondents acknowledged participation in at least one
core microbiology activity, the scope of service was variable throughout the WCLN. Of
all the respondents, 96.1% performed activities related to four core activities: speci-
men collection and transport; specimen processing and handling; rapid nonmolecular,
nonserology assays; and direct microscopic examination (Table 1). A total of 90.3% of
the laboratories engaged in the primary processing of routine bacterial, fungus, acid-
fast bacillus (AFB), and/or virus cultures. In contrast, 55.3% and 59.2% of the respon-
dents were involved in screening and increased-complexity culture interpretation,
respectively (Table 1). When assessing laboratory risk in a general sense, the
respondents were more likely to cite specimen source and the speciﬁc clinical test
requisition (e.g., AFB culture, fungus culture) than considerations such as patient
occupation, patient travel history, and the health status of the individuals perform-
ing the testing (Table 2).
Facility assessment. According to the 5th edition of Biosafety in Microbiological and
Biomedical Laboratories (20), 15 minimal criteria must be met for a laboratory to receive
a BSL-1 classiﬁcation. Of the 103 survey respondents, the vast majority reported
compliance with nine of these criteria, with nearly 90% of the respondents having a
laboratory design compatible with cleaning and possession of a hand-washing sink
near the laboratory exit (Table 3). Criteria for BSL-1 status with which the laboratories
had lower rates of compliance included implementation of an effective pest manage-
ment program (82.5% of the respondents); decontamination of cultures, stocks, and
other infectious materials prior to disposal (76.7%); the presence of screen-ﬁtted
exterior windows (69.9%); and placement of a biohazard sign at the entrance of the
laboratory when infectious agents are present (61.2%). With respect to signage content,
signiﬁcant deﬁcits were additionally noted (and easily corrected) and included the
provision of the laboratory biosafety level, the name of the supervisor or some other
contact, the telephone number for the contact, and the procedure required for enter-
ing/exiting the laboratory.
Beyond the aforementioned criteria required for BSL-1 status, 14 additional minimal
criteria must be satisﬁed for BSL-2 classiﬁcation (20). Of the 84 respondents claiming
BSL-2 status, the vast majority demonstrated compliance with eight of these elements.
Almost 90% of the respondents reported the presence of self-closing doors that may be
locked to control access to the laboratory (Table 4). The percentage of laboratories that
decontaminate (by autoclave, incineration, or chemical treatment) potentially infec-
tious laboratory waste prior to disposal and that advise persons entering the laboratory
of the potential presence of hazards was nearly the same for each of these two criteria.
Data showing that less than three-fourths of the respondents open centrifuge safety
cups/carriers in a biosafety cabinet, possess an automatic or manually operated hands-
free hand-washing sink, and maintain vacuum lines with HEPA ﬁlters suggest that
additional mitigation steps during these processes would improve biosafety practices
even further, ultimately improving the culture of biosafety.
Nine laboratories self-reported that they were at BSL-3 status, yet no single labora-
tory satisﬁed all 12 additional minimal criteria for that designation (data not illustrated).
Speciﬁc opportunities for improvement were both operational (annual testing and/or
Microbiology Laboratory Risk Assessment Journal of Clinical Microbiology
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TABLE 1 Scope of microbiology-related activities among WCLN risk assessment survey
respondents, 2016a
Activity % of respondents
Specimen collection and transport
Phlebotomy 95.1
Specimen transport 93.2
Assist with collection of bone marrow aspirate specimens 58.3
Collection of nasal swab specimens 54.4
Collection of throat swab specimens 50.5
Assist with collection of ﬁne-needle aspirate specimens 37.8
No engagement in specimen collection and transport 2.9
Specimen processing and handling
Specimen handling 97.1
Utilization of biosafety cabinet 94.2
Specimen receipt 94.2
Packaging and shipping of primary specimens 79.6
Utilization of chemical fume hood 46.6
No engagement in specimen processing and handling 1.0
Performance of rapid nonmolecular, nonserology assays for:
Legionella pneumophila 98.1
Streptococcus pyogenes 86.4
Respiratory syncytial virus 71.8
Inﬂuenza virus 69.9
Cryptosporidium spp./Giardia spp. 35.0
Shiga toxin 25.2
Clostridium difﬁcile 25.2
Rotavirus 24.3
Streptococcus pneumoniae 22.3
Other agents b
No engagement in rapid nonmolecular, nonserology assays 3.9
Direct microscopic examination by:
Gram staining 88.3
Cell count and differential 88.3
Wet mount microscopy 88.3
Urinalysis 87.4
KOH/calcoﬂuor white staining 73.8
AFB staining 20.4
Parasitology 17.5
Virus immunoﬂuorescence 2.9
No engagement in direct microscopic examination 3.9
Culture setup for:
Blood culture 81.6
Routine bacteria 76.7
Fungus 30.1
AFB 23.3
Virus 2.9
No engagement in culture setup 9.7
Screening culturesc
Throat swab specimens 45.6
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 42.7
Urine specimens 38.8
Otherd 31.1
No engagement in screening cultures 44.7
Culture interpretation
Routine bacteriology 59.2
Fungus 21.4
AFB 16.5
Virus 2.9
No engagement in culture interpretation 40.8
(Continued on next page)
Munson et al. Journal of Clinical Microbiology
January 2018 Volume 56 Issue 1 e01569-17 jcm.asm.org 4
 o
n
 June 6, 2018 by M
arquette University Libraries
http://jcm.asm.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
replacement of HEPA ﬁlters) and administrative (veriﬁcation and documentation of
parameters and procedures both prior to facility opening and on an annual basis) in
nature. Opportunities for improvements in design were also evident and related to
requirements for impervious, slip-resistant ﬂooring; proper sealing of doors, ventilation
openings, walls, and ceilings; nonreversal of airﬂow in the event of failure conditions;
and HEPA ﬁltering of laboratory exhaust.
Task assessment. Of all the respondents, 88% complied with 93 of the 121
required mitigation control measures within the task assessment. Items of signiﬁcance
yielding lower levels of compliance are itemized in Tables 5 and 6. With respect to
specimen collection and transport, suboptimal compliance was noted in the donning
of lead gowns by laboratorians assisting in the procurement of computed tomography
(CT)-guided bone marrow or ﬁne-needle aspiration specimens (Table 5). Of 96 respon-
dents utilizing transit tubes (such as pneumatic tube systems), almost 30% did not have
a remediation procedure in the event of breakage. With respect to specimen processing
and handling, nearly 80% of the respondents reported having at least two individuals
who were certiﬁed in the packaging and shipping of infectious substances. However,
less than 70% of these respondents possessed documentation of this training and
ensured subsequent competency.
Common compliance deﬁciencies with respect to not covering biohazardous waste
receptacles when not in use and not using freezer gloves for protection when entering
a freezer were observed over a wide range of disciplines. Deﬁciencies particularly
tended to occur in areas of the laboratory that perform microbiological techniques
outside traditional culture interpretation (Table 5). While 94.2% of the laboratories in
general reported utilizing a biosafety cabinet for culture processing, only 28.2% of the
respondents processed specimens for non-AFB-related direct microscopic examination
in a biosafety cabinet when they were cognizant of the fact that AFB studies of the
specimen were also requested. Sections of the laboratory performing direct micro-
scopic examination also yielded compliance rates of80% for the proper management
of discarded materials. Sections of the laboratory participating in screening cultures (in
which either a speciﬁc microbe is isolated using chromogenic/selective medium or the
growth obtained by cultivation techniques is referred to another laboratory for iden-
TABLE 1 (Continued)
aData are for 103 respondents.
bNonmolecular, nonserology testing for Cryptococcus spp. (17.5%), Campylobacter spp. (12.6%), fecal
inﬂammatory markers (8.7), Plasmodium spp. (6.8%), human immunodeﬁciency virus (6.8%), mononucleosis
(Monospot assay; 5.8%), Trichomonas vaginalis (3.9%), Helicobacter pylori (3.9%), and central nervous system
bacterial antigens (1.9%).
cIncludes the use of colorimetric screening media or screening cultures with the goal of discarding negative
plates and sending positive plates to a reference laboratory.
dIncludes screens for methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus, Streptococcus agalactiae, yeast,
ﬂuoroquinolone-resistant Gram-negative bacilli, multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacilli, vancomycin-
resistant Enterococcus spp., and environmental organisms (endoscopes).
TABLE 2 Routine considerations when assessing laboratory risk, WCLN risk assessment
survey respondents, 2016a
Consideration % of respondents
Specimen source and associated pathogens 100.0
Test requisitionb 98.1
Method of transmission and infectious dose 84.5
Risk factors for persons performing testingc 81.6
Patient symptoms and travel history 51.5
Patient occupation 24.3
aData are for 103 respondents.
bIncluding, but not limited to, tests for systemic mycotic agents, acid-fast bacilli, viruses, and potential
bioterrorism agents.
cIncluding, but not limited to, immunization status, pregnancy, illness or treatment, physical disability, and
training and experience.
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tiﬁcation) often failed to employ proper personal protective equipment during various
phases of culture management.
Many opportunities for improvement in the microbiology laboratories were related
to the manipulation of particularly hazardous organisms. Of all the respondents, 75.4%
reported performing potentially aerosol-generating work with high-risk bacterial
pathogens in a functional biosafety cabinet using BSL-3 practices (controlled access to
the area when work is in progress; decontamination of all waste; wearing of a
solid-front gown with cuffed sleeves, gloves, and an N-95 respirator; Table 6). A total of
76.5% of the respondents reported that all work with AFB was performed with BSL-3
practices. Approximately one-half of the work with suspect systemic fungi was accom-
panied by the use of BSL-3 practices, and less than 75% of the respondents visually
notify fellow laboratorians of ongoing work with these suspect cultures.
Other task assessments came under the auspices of additional preferred mitigation
control measures. Within the realm of specimen collection and transport, 9.2% of 98
respondents utilized optimal protective eyewear during phlebotomy for the collection
of blood for culture (data not illustrated), while 46.9% disinfected areas where blood is
drawn when the patient is known to harbor an organism of nosocomial signiﬁcance.
Less than 40% of the respondents inquired about a signiﬁcant travel history before
specimen procurement. With respect to specimen processing and handling, 46.0% of
the respondents processed all microbiology-related specimens in a biosafety cabinet; in
TABLE 3 Percent compliance with individual BSL-1 requirements, WCLN risk assessment
survey respondents, 2016a
Requirementb % compliance
Laboratory design compatible with cleaningc 89.3
Hand-washing sink near laboratory exit 89.3
Effective pest management program 82.5
Decontamination of cultures and other infectious
materials before disposal
76.7
Screens on windows opening to the exterior (if present) 69.9
Placement of a biohazard sign at the entrance when
infectious agents are present
61.2
aData are for 103 respondents.
bRequirements that are not speciﬁcally listed here but that met a 90% rate of compliance among the
respondents included (in order of increasing compliance) benchtops impervious to water and resistant to
heat, organic solvents, and other chemicals; access to laboratory controlled by doors; safe handling of
sharps; procedures to minimize splashes and/or aerosols; decontamination of work surfaces; availability of
personal protective equipment; prohibition of food, drink, smoking, cosmetic application, and contact lens
handling; availability of mechanical pipetting devices; and appropriate personnel training regarding duties
and prevention of exposure.
cExamples include nonporous chair coverings and the absence of carpets and rugs.
TABLE 4 Percent compliance with additional requirements constituting BSL-2 status,
WCLN risk assessment survey respondents, 2016a
Requirementb % compliance
Have self-closing doors that may be locked to control access 89.3
Decontaminate potentially hazardous laboratory waste before disposal 82.1
Advise persons entering laboratory about potential hazards or have
them meet speciﬁc entry/exit requirements
78.6
Open centrifuge safety carriers only in a biosafety cabinet 72.6
Have an automatic or manually operated hands-free hand-washing sink 71.4
Protect vacuum lines with HEPA ﬁlters or equivalent 59.5
aData are for 84 respondents.
bRequirements not speciﬁcally listed in Table 4 that met a 90% rate of compliance among the respondents
included (in order of increasing compliance) the availability of a biosafety manual, prohibition of plants
from the laboratory, removal of personal protective equipment prior to leaving for nonlaboratory areas,
decontamination of laboratory equipment after splashes with contaminated material and on a routine basis,
performance of procedures involving manipulation of infectious materials that may generate an aerosol in a
class II biosafety cabinet, offering of immunizations and medical surveillance to laboratory personnel,
demonstration of competency in standard and special microbiology practices, and immediate evaluation
and documentation of exposure incidents (with treatment provision).
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terms of microbiology culture requisitions, 60.2% of the laboratories processed the
specimens in a biosafety cabinet. A total of 48.5% of the available biosafety cabinets
possessed an audible airﬂow alarm.
A total of 26.0% of the respondents performing specimen processing and handling
reported the use of an additional preferred mitigation control measure in which
TABLE 5 Selected functions reﬂective of required microbiology mitigation controls, with
percent compliance among WCLN risk assessment survey respondents, 2016
Required mitigation control
No. of qualiﬁed
respondents % compliance
Wear a lead gown when assisting with CT-guided:
Fine-needle aspiration 39 59.0
Bone marrow aspiration 60 45.0
Have a procedure for remediation of transit tube breakage 96 70.8
Document packaging/shipping certiﬁcation for two
laboratorians
82 68.3
Provide refresher packaging/shipping training (plus
competency) every 2 yr
82 62.2
Split primary specimen for AFB/fungus culture in biosafety
cabinet
100 68.0
Cover partially ﬁlled waste receptacles when not used
Nonmolecular, nonserologic assays 98 82.7
Direct microscopic examination 89 65.2
Screening cultures 59 74.6
Culture interpretation 52 82.7
Use freezer gloves for specimen storage
Specimen processing and handling 95 42.1
Nonmolecular, nonserologic assays 97 52.6
Screening cultures 60 55.0
Culture interpretation 54 57.4
Process specimens for direct microscopic examination in a
biosafety cabinet when specimen also requires testing
for AFB
103 28.2
Double-bag waste (direct microscopic examination) 89 78.7
Ensure that the sharps container does not exceed 2/3 vol
(direct microscopic examination)
89 79.8
Use proper personal protective equipment (culture setup) 93 84.9
Follow written procedures (screening cultures) 103 54.4
Wear a laboratory coat (screening cultures) 103 52.4
Use proper personal protective equipment during culture
retention (screening cultures)
60 26.7
TABLE 6 Selected functions more reﬂective of required microbiology mitigation controls
in the traditional microbiology culture interpretation setting with percent compliance
among WCLN risk assessment survey respondents, 2016
Required mitigation control
No. of qualiﬁed
respondents % compliance
Perform aerosol-generating work in a biosafety cabinet with
BSL-3 practices (high-risk bacterial pathogen)
61 75.4
Perform all work with AFB in a biosafety cabinet with BSL-3
practices
17 76.5
Perform all potential work with systemic fungi in a
biosafety cabinet with BSL-3 practices
22 54.5
Perform all culture work with suspect or highly pathogenic
viruses in a biosafety cabinet with BSL-3 practices
3 33.3
Post a sign warning others when working with systemic
fungus cultures
22 50.0
Post a sign warning others when working with AFB cultures 17 70.6
Decontaminate waste (including liquid) from highly
pathogenic microbes prior to disposal
52 69.2
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specimen tubes are uncapped with the assistance of gauze or a suitable disinfectant
(data not illustrated); 27.0% of the respondents donned additional personal protective
equipment when the specimen is known to emanate from a patient housed under
aerosol or droplet precautions. Similar percentages of respondents reported that they
performed these additional mitigation control measures in the context of rapid non-
molecular, nonserology assays. Should these assays require mixing or vortexing, 47.5%
of the respondents performed these steps in a biosafety cabinet. Of the 103 respon-
dents performing direct microscopic examination, 35.0% prepared the slides in a
biosafety cabinet. A total of 18.4% added BSL-3 practices if the specimen is known to
emanate from a patient housed under aerosol or droplet precautions.
DISCUSSION
Proper biosafety practices and mitigation control measures are essential elements of
a culture of laboratory biosafety to protect laboratory professionals from signiﬁcant
exposures and laboratory-acquired infections. A heightened awareness of the need for
a strong culture of laboratory biosafety has arisen in response to the increasing
potential for encountering highly virulent and/or highly antimicrobial-resistant organ-
isms in routine clinical practice (23), making sentinel observations of purported bioter-
rorism agents (24), and properly managing biological select agents (25). The assurance
of biosafety is not restricted to facility-related provisions or other engineering controls;
human behaviors also contribute to the implementation of a culture of laboratory
biosafety. An international survey of 23 BSL-3 and -4 facilities (26) revealed that while
the incidence of laboratory-acquired infections was extremely low, the underlying
cause for nearly 80% of these laboratory-acquired infections was human error. Taken
together, one element crucial to a culture of laboratory biosafety is identiﬁcation of
a champion for this cause in each individual laboratory. This individual may have the
title of medical director, certiﬁed clinical microbiologist, principal investigator, or
dedicated laboratory biosafety ofﬁcer and must demonstrate commitment to ongoing
staff education, training, and proﬁciency monitoring.
The performance of a biosafety risk assessment constitutes an important initial
measure to ensure this culture of biosafety. A standardized risk assessment question-
naire (inclusive of applicable deﬁnitions, required standards, and optimal mitigation
controls) was distributed to laboratorians at 150 WCLN sites. The advantages of
distributing this tool in such a manner include the opportunity for bench-level labo-
ratorian participation in the completion of the risk assessment questionnaire. Past
surveys conducted in the context of hospital safety (27, 28) have demonstrated that
laboratorians are more apt than physicians or nonclinical hospital employees to answer
the questions that have been posed in a less positive fashion and to delineate
infrastructure deﬁciencies. When extrapolated to the current survey, the implied
greater knowledge of current state of practice and/or the genuine frankness of the
response from laboratorians would contribute to a baseline of data on which educa-
tional or improvement efforts may be developed. Another strength of this project is
that the information obtained is generalizable to both clinical laboratories and labo-
ratory networks in other states and regions because of the broad scope of the
laboratories surveyed. The 103 laboratories that provided responses to the question-
naire ranged from those performing 16,000 billable tests per year to those performing
up to 5.3 million billable tests per year, served various levels of acuity, and were
distributed in both rural and urban regions of Wisconsin (56% of the laboratories were
located in communities with populations of less than 25,000). Nearly all respondents
were engaged in activities related to specimen collection and transport; over 90%
processed primary clinical specimens for routine bacterial, fungus, AFB, and/or virus
culture (Table 1).
Overall data from this exercise indicate a reasonable level of compliance with
required and best practice mitigation controls within the network of clinical laborato-
ries surveyed. In terms of task assessment, over 88% of the respondents fell within
compliance for more than three-quarters of the required mitigation control measures
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listed in the risk assessment. At the same time, the opportunities for laboratory biosafety
improvement identiﬁed include those related to the acquisition of the patient/clinical
history for certain primary clinical specimens (Table 2), the discernment of laboratory
biosafety level status (Tables 3 and 4), the performance of microbiology-related tasks by
laboratory generalists (Table 5), and the manipulation of specimens derived from
certain at-risk patients (such as those with infections with systemic fungi or Mycobac-
terium spp.; Table 6). At the same time, it should be noted that reference, public health,
and other tertiary laboratories may not have direct access to data regarding the
infection control or isolation status of certain patients.
A number of factors could explain the decreased rates of compliance with certain
aspects of the risk assessment. It is possible that the yes/no format for providing answers
to the risk assessment questionnaire may have limited the ability of the respondents to
answer certain questions to the fullest degree of accuracy because of variable circum-
stances at a given institution. As an example, in the context of BSL-1 practices, less than
80% of the respondents reported that they decontaminated cultures, stocks, and other
infectious materials prior to disposal. It is possible that laboratories that reported noncom-
pliance with this questionnaire item instead ship biohazardous waste to an off-site decon-
tamination facility for disposal through a commercial vendor. Other items within the risk
assessment may have been subject to misinterpretation or other mitigating circumstances
that could not be captured through the format used for questioning.
Decreased rates of compliance with elements of a biosafety risk assessment may
additionally be a function of complacency within the laboratory. Complacency can be
deﬁned as a human risk factor that is a result of boredom and a lack of responsible
leadership. Managerial or peer accountability is one means of controlling for complacency
(Sean Kaufman, Behavioral-Based Improvement Solutions, personal communication). An
observation of 93 laboratorians employed across 21 BSL-2 facilities at a U.S. university
documented an average of 2.6 hand-to-face contacts per working hour, with over 80% of
these contacts involving the nose or forehead (29). The frequency of such contacts was
determined to be a function of the perception of an infectious risk, as workers who
perceived that greater health risks were associated with the agent(s) studied in the
particular laboratory were less likely to touch their face. In 2016, CDC revealed a national
tuberculosis incidence rate of 2.9 cases per 100,000 persons, with the incidence rate in
Wisconsin being 0.7 cases per 100,000 persons (30), which was the lowest among the ﬁve
states constituting the East North Central division. Nearly two-thirds of the culture-
conﬁrmed tuberculosis cases in Wisconsin emanate from the top two population centers of
the state (Laura Louison, WSLH, personal communication). Therefore, the low prevalence of
tuberculosis in most regions of Wisconsin and the perceived low risk of laboratory-acquired
infection due to Mycobacterium tuberculosis may translate into a sense of laboratory
complacency for some and contribute to selected lower rates of compliance with the
traditional microbiology laboratory items assessed in Table 6.
Finally, intrinsic knowledge and educational efforts can contribute to a general
culture of laboratory biosafety. Odetokun et al. (31) reported that 5.4% of participants
in a survey of Nigeria veterinary laboratories demonstrated a satisfactory knowledge of
laboratory biosafety and security, while 94.6% demonstrated poor knowledge. Among
the researchers, 25.7% and 74.3% were documented to have high and low levels of
awareness about biosafety, respectively. Ghanchi et al. (32) reported 40%, 66%, and
74% rates of acknowledgment of the importance of disinfection, personal protective
equipment, and biohazardous waste disposal, respectively, as part of biosafety prac-
tices during antimicrobial susceptibility testing in Pakistani clinical laboratories. A risk
assessment of gain-of-function research (33) acknowledged gaps in knowledge about
biosafety in the United States and concluded that governments should invest a fraction
of their funding support in the prevention of biological accidents and subsequent
laboratory-acquired infections. While the degrees of education and vocational require-
ments can vary globally, it is imperative that microbiologists develop and maintain
competency in facets of biosafety, including those related to updates in mitigation
control practices.
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In summary, while some of the aforementioned limitations may have impacted the
data analysis, the data presented here represent an appropriate baseline for future
efforts to improve laboratory biosafety in Wisconsin. Current activities of LabTAG with
respect to this biosafety endeavor include discussion of the ﬁndings and focused
refresher training on the basics of biosafety with members of the WCLN. In addition, a
follow-up risk assessment exercise is planned. This follow-up is necessary on the basis
of the fact that several elements of laboratory biosafety were either unbeknownst to or
not implemented by the laboratories. If improvements are noted, attempts will be
made to determine whether completion of the initial risk assessment resulted in
changes in biosafety-related practices. If signiﬁcant improvements are not noted,
additional studies may be necessary to determine whether clinical laboratories handle
biosafety as stringently as they could or if completion of a risk assessment is worth the
time expended by laboratories in a practical sense. Ultimately, data emanating from
this risk assessment tool may be generalizable to other locations and assist with
identifying facility- and process-based improvements that will increase vigilance toward
biosafety among both microbiologists and laboratory generalists and properly prepare
them for routine and aberrant scenarios.
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